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A new setting for analyzing problems in information-based complexity is formu- 
lated and  discussed. By using concepts from two-person zero-sum game theory, a  
randomized setting results from defining the nth minimal radius as  an  infimum 
over “mixed” strategies of information operators and  algorithms. After present- 
ing an  example, some general  results are developed on  the randomized radius and  
its relationship to average and  worst case radii. o 1987 Academic PW. IK. 
In formulating problems in order to study their complexity, there is 
growing awareness of the importance of the setting in which we measure 
the error and  cost of algorithms. Wh ile the time-honored worst case set- 
ting may be  appropriate in situations where one  must ensure against ca- 
tastrophe, recent emphasis has been  increasingly directed toward average 
case analysis. To  emp loy an  average case criterion, however, one  must be  
willing and  able to assume some fixed and  presumably realistic probability 
distribution on  the space of problem elements. This is not always an  easy 
task and  it often occurs that the choice of a  distribution is based more on  
simplicity and  computational convenience than on  knowledge of the sort 
of problem elements that are likely to be  encountered. 
In this paper  we present, in the context of information-based complex- 
ity, a  setting for analysis that has the potential to avoid the undue  pessi- 
m ism of the worst case without making the often unwarranted assumption 
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of a known distribution needed for the average case. The basic idea is to 
allow for the possibility of random “moves” by the algorithm designer in 
terms of information gathered about problem elements and how that infor- 
mation is dealt with. This approach, which will lean heavily on the formal- 
ism of two-person zero-sum game theory, is certainly not new. It has 
antecedents in statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girschick, 1954; 
Savage, 1972) and in the Monte Carlo methods of numerical analysis. 
More recently, randomization methods in computer science have led to 
interesting results. Rabin (1976) considers “probabilistic algorithms” and 
Yao (1977) has developed a notion of randomized complexity for discrete 
problems that is very much in the spirit of what is proposed here for 
continuous problems having partial information. Wasilkowski (1987) also 
considers the efficacy of randomization for continuous problems in which 
information is provided by function evaluations. 
The randomized setting that will result from our game-theoretic treat- 
ment will give rise to a randomized radius of information for a problem 
that is generally bounded below by the average case radius and bounded 
above by the worst case radius. The resultant notion of randomized com- 
plexity will be correspondingly bounded by the average and worst case 
complexities. 
In the next section we sketch relevant results from information-based 
complexity. The following section summarizes ideas needed from two- 
person game theory and relates them to our interest in approximately 
solving continuous problems. We show by example that so-called worst 
case optimal error algorithms are not generally optimal in the game-theo- 
retic sense. This provides motivation for considering randomized (mixed 
strategy) algorithms. We then present some of the possible advantages of 
a randomized approach and develop some general results. The final sec- 
tion discusses some of the difficulties associated with this approach along 
with a number of open questions that arise. 
RELEVANT CONCEPTS FROM INFORMATION-BASED COMPLEXITY 
In this section we present selected ideas from information-based com- 
plexity in a form that will mesh well with the decision-theoretic concepts 
of the following section. For more complete and systematic surveys of 
information-based complexity, the reader is referred to Woiniakowski 
(1986) and Packel and Woiniakowski (1987). 
Let S: F+ G be a mapping between normed linear spaces (the solution 
operator) and let N: F + IV’ be an information operator providing infor- 
mation on each problem element f E F. We denote a class of allowable 
information operators with range R” by N,, , where the positive integer n is 
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the cardinality of information. We seek to approximate Sf knowing only 
the information Nf about f rather thanfitself. Then any function 4: Rn + 
G defines an algorithm that will use the vector information provided by an 
information operator from N,, to approximate Sf. We let @‘n denote a class 
of allowable algorithms for the problem in question. 
For a given choice of information N, algorithm 4, and problem element 
f, the resulting error is given by l]Sf - Q(Nf)(l. Define the worst case error 
for information N and an algorithm 4 by 
If we assume that any choice of information and algorithm will encounter 
a problem element maximizing the error, we obtain the worst case nth 
minimal radius for S by defining 
r-p’“‘(S) = inf{e(N, 4) : (N, 4) E N, X Qn}. 
A pair (N, $) for which the above infimum is achieved is defined to be an 
optimal error informationallalgorithm pair for S. For simplicity we as- 
sume throughout that infimum values are obtained. 
Given an error tolerance E r 0 and a “model of computation” (see 
Woiniakowski (1986) for a development of this topic) in which cost is 
approximately proportional to the cardinality of information used, the 
Algorithm Designer will naturally seek the minimal cardinality of informa- 
tion n such that ry’(S) 5 E. We assume such a model of computation 
and we fix n to be this minimal value. Given (N, 4) E N, x a, and f E F, 
let cost(N, f) denote the information cost of computing N(f) and let 
cost(4, N( f )) denote the combinatory cost of computing 4(N( f )). We can 
now define the fundamental idea of &-complexity in the worst case setting 
for a problem S: F + G, 
camp(s) = inf sup{cost(N, f) + cost($, N(f))}. 
ew?#4- RF 
A pair (N, c$) for which the above infimum results is defined to be an 
optimal E-complexity information/algorithm pair. If we assume that the 
information cost depends only on the cardinality of information n (i.e., it 
is independent off) and that the combinatory cost is negligible in compar- 
ison to the information cost, the search for such optimal pairs essentially 
reduces to the search for optimal error information/algorithm pairs. With 
this rationale, we focus in the remainder of the paper on issues involving 
error minimization and the nth minimal radius. 
To develop ideas analogous to those above in an average case setting 
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we assume a known probability distribution over the set F of problem 
elements in the form a measure p on a r-algebra of subsets of F. Then the 
error that results from an information-algorithm pair (N, C#J) is defined by 
J#f - ~#@“)ll~(df). The average case nth minimal radius for S is then 
defined by 
We will henceforth assume appropriate measurability properties of inte- 
grands so that integrals with respect to our probability measures are de- 
fined. 
It follows easily that rY(S, ,u) I r, ““‘“‘(S) V IZ E N whatever probability 
measure p is assumed on F. In either setting, the nth minimal radius can 
be neatly formulated without reference to the idea of algorithms at all 
(Traub and Woiniakowski, 1980; Wasilkowski, 1983), emphasizing that it 
represents (for each fixed n) the uncertainty inherent in the problem de- 
fined by S. This algorithm-independent formulation also has geometrical 
aspects that justify the use of the term “radius.” For our game-theoretic 
purposes we choose to emphasize the idea of taking an infimum over the 
space Cp of allowable algorithms. 
To illustrate the above ideas and set the stage for later developments, 
we consider a simple integration example. Let the space F of problem 
elements be defined by 
F = {f E CLO, II :f(O) = f(1) = 0 and If’(t)] I 1 almost everywhere}. 
The solution operator S whose values we seek to approximate is the 
definite integral, Sf= /Af(t)dt. For any n we take as our space of allowable 
information N, the result of function evaluations at any n points on (0, 1). 
Thus any N E N,, can be specified by selecting tl, t2, . . . , t, with 0 < 
tl < t2 < * - * < t, < 1 so that Nf = [f(tr), f(tJ, . . . , f&J]. 
In the worst case setting it is not difficult to see that, for any given 12, 
optimal information is obtained by choosing the tl equally spaced over [0, 
I] (see Fig. 1). It is also apparent that an optimal algorithm for any 
function evaluation information is simply trapezoidal integration. It fol- 
lows that a problem element resulting in the largest error is a “sawtooth” 
function of the form illustrated in Fig. 1. The nth minimal radius in the 
worst case is therefore the area under the sawtooth and we get ryt(S) = 
1/4(n + 1). To ensure an error no larger than E, we must have IZ 2 r1/4& - 
11 and a major step in determining the worst case &-complexity of this 
integration problem has been illustrated. Much more general results along 
these lines can be obtained for different classes F. The reader may find 
over 100 papers referenced in Traub and Woiniakowski (1980). 
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FIG. 1. Optimal information and largest error in worst case, n = 3. 
In an average case setting, the first challenge is to come up with a 
reasonable measure on the function space F. Since Lebesgue-type mea- 
sures do not exist on infinite-dimensional spaces, recent attention has 
been centered on Wiener and, more generally, Gaussian measures on 
such spaces. Lee and Wasilkowski (1986) have obtained numerous results 
in such a setting which may apply to our specific problem. Since our goal 
to clarify via example is better served by working in a simpler context, we 
apply a more primitive measure to our integration example and look at the 
n = 1 case (only one function evaluation is allowed). 
We assume that the only allowable problem elements are functions 
made up of four linear pieces each having slope with absolute value one. 
We further assume that such functions have a single point s E (0, 1) with 
f(s) = 0 (recall that f(0) = f( 1) = 0 as well) and do not change their sign. 
Finally, we propose a distribution p of such functions whereby the zero 
point s is uniformly distributed over (0, 1) and the two possible functions 
withf(s) = 0 are each equally likely (see Fig. 2). 
In addition to providing some challenge to the Algorithm Designer, 
imposing this distribution allows us to view Nature’s strategies as a pa- 
rameter space with parameters E (0, 1). In response to this known distri- 
bution, the Algorithm Designer also has a one-dimensional space of strat- 
egies parameterized by the point r E (0, 1) at which the single function 
evaluation is made. For added simplicity we require that with information 
f(t) the Algorithm Designer use the algorithm which takes ~#@(t)> to be the 
geometric center of the set {Sg : g E F and g(t) = f(t)} of all solution 
operator values on problem elements having the same information as jC 
Thus, in this example, variation of strategy by the Algorithm Designer can 
only occur through the choice of information. 
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FIG. 2. The two allowable problem elements for s = $. 
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Some straightforward geometrical computation yields the following for- 
mula for the algorithm $J described above (we give values only for 0 < t I 
+ and forf(t) 2 0 since other results can be determined by symmetry): 
i 
& iff(t) = t 5 f 
w-(t)) = 
g[2t* - t + $1 if f 5 t = f(t) 5 t 
f[i + (t - f)2 + (f(t))21 if0 <f(t) < t 5: 
lo iff(t) = 0. 
Note that the case with +(f(t)) = 0 arises because only in this instance can 
both a positive and a negative function (see Fig. 2) have the same informa- 
tion, so the Algorithm Designer chooses the midpoint value of the two 
definite integrals, namely 0. 
The error function that arises from a specific problem element de- 
scribed by s and information described by t can be shown to have the form 
if t 5 4 and t 5 sl2 
if 4 5 t 5 s/2 
ifsi2Itr$andsft 
ifs = t. 
(1) 
We note for future reference that the function E(s, t) is continuous on the 
open unit square except along the line s = t and that E can be extended 
“continuously” to the closed unit square. 
To determine the average case 1st minimal radius we should compute 
s! E(s, t)ds and then find the minimum value of this function with respect 
to t. In our example such a computation can be avoided since the symme- 
try of the situation guarantees that E(s, f) = 0 except at the point s = t, a 
set of measure 0. Consequently the optimal average case strategy is to 
choose t = 4 (the same optimal strategy as in the worst case) and the 
resulting average case radius is rY(S, p) = 0. As expected, this average 
case radius is smaller than the worst case 1st minimal radius, which has a 
value of &. 
ZERO-SUMTWO-PERSONGAMESANDTHERANDOMIZED 
ERROR CRITERION 
There is already a game-theoretic flavor to what we have developed 
above. Thus the worst case setting can be viewed as allowing Nature to 
choose a problem element (strategy) after observing the information- 
algorithm pair (strategy) chosen by the Algorithm Designer. Conse- 
quently, the Algorithm Designer can do no better than to minimize over 
the maximal errors omnisciently arranged by Nature. 
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The average case setting is biased in the other direction, allowing the 
Algorithm Designer “precise” probabilistic information about the distri- 
bution of Nature’s choices for problem elements. A hint of what is to 
follow is given by the fact that Nature is at least permitted to randomize 
over the problem elements rather than being forced to reveal a pure 
problem element strategy at the outset. 
To find a middle ground between these two potentially biased ap- 
proaches we need look no further than the beautiful theory of two-person 
zero-sum games introduced by Von Neumann (1928) and refined in Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). As a first step, we choose a subset F0 
of the problem space F as the set of pure strategies for the first player, 
Nature. The strategy set for the Algorithm Designer is the set A = N,, x 
Qp, (we regard n as fixed but arbitrary). Let a = (N, 4) denote a generic 
member of this set. If we take as the payoff function (or utility) for the 
strategy pair (f, a) the error E(f, a) = I[@-- +(Nf)l[, we can regard this as 
a two-person zero-sum game. Formally, E: F. x A + R defines the game 
whereby Nature seeks to maximize E(f, a) while the Algorithm Designer 
seeks to minimize this error. 
We digress briefly to note that we are glossing over several important 
philosophical issues here. We are assuming that the error E(f, a) is re- 
garded as a negative utility by the Algorithm Designer with no real basis 
for this assumption. Perhaps more seriously, we appear to be ascribing to 
Nature characteristics of intelligence and utility maximization commonly 
ascribed to the players in game theory. Both these issues are thoroughly 
addressed and responded to with some success in Savage (1972). In fact, 
our current development is on a path well trodden in statistical decision 
theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1954), where the “minimax theory” of 
statistical games closely parallels the theory of two-person zero-sum 
games. 
Returning to the game defined by E: F0 x A + R, we develop some 
standard concepts from game theory. The Algorithm Designer, upon 
choosing strategy a, will face an error of at most E*(u) = SUP~~F~ E(f, a) 
and can minimize to ensure an error no larger than E * = infaEA E&z). This 
is precisely the worst case nth minimal radius as defined above. Reason- 
ing analogously from a maximizing Nature’s point of view, a choice of 
strategy fwill ensure a payoff of at least E,(f) = infQEA E(f, a). This can 
be maximized to guarantee an error of at least E, = SUP~~F~ El(f). 
It follows readily that E, 5 E*. Games for which this inequality is in 
fact an equality are said to have a pure value. Strategiesf* and a* (pro- 
vided they exist) that yield the appropriate sup and infare called optimal 
pure strategies. If an information-based complexity problem has a pure 
value then a worst case treatment becomes very natural since the equilib- 
rium property of an optimal strategy leaves no incentive to (unilaterally) 
deviate from it. Of course accurate knowledge of a distribution of problem 
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elements (Nature’s pure strategies) would call for an average case treat- 
ment even in the presence of a pure value. 
A major point of this paper is that, in information-based complexity as 
in most games, existence of a pure value is a most unlikely occurrence. In 
the absence of a pure value, we take the standard game-theoretic ap- 
proach of allowing mixed strategies in the form of probability distribu- 
tions over the strategy spaces. Starting with the game E: FO x A - R, we 
let P denote a set of probability distributions over Fo and we let A denote a 
set of probability distributions over the information-algorithm strategy 
space A. Many technical difficulties are lurking here, but we avoid them 
by requiring that, unless otherwise specified, sets of probability distribu- 
tions include at least all discrete probability distributions over the pure 
strategy space. We do not discuss specifics of nondiscrete distributions 
that may also be included, though we shall subsequently use integrals in 
working with general distributions. We choose this approach since infor- 
mation-based complexity generally deals with “continuous” problems 
and measures. 
Letting Al. denote a measure in 8 and (Y a measure in A, the error 
resulting from each of these mixed strategies is given by 
We use this rule for l? to define the mixed extension B: fi x A + R to the 
game E: FO x A ---, R. Repeating the sup and infconstructions on E, we let 
{&Y) = supPEp ,?$, a) and 8* = inf,,d &(Y). Analogously, we define 
E,(p) = infolEA E(p, a) and 8, = supper El(p). 
In a wide variety of situations this mixed extension game is guaranteed 
to have a value (k, = 8*). For two-person games where each player has a 
finite number of pure strategies, this is the celebrated minimax theory of 
Von Neumann. Leaving more general situations until the next section, we 
note that the presence of a value and a randomized case setting bring the 
information-based complexity use of the term “optimal” into full agree- 
ment with its game-theoretic use. 
Whether or not a value exists, we can now define the randomized case 
nth minimal radius for an information-based complexity problem defined 
by S: FO + G  with information and algorithm strategy spaces given by N,, 
and $, respectively, by 
where 8* is defined as indicated above for the mixed extension of the 
pure strategy game between Nature and the Algorithm Designer. It can be 
readily checked that the randomized radius parallels the worst case radius 
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but allows the Algorithm Designer to randomize by choosing mixed infor- 
mation-algorithm pairs to decrease Nature’s effectiveness in coming up 
with a worst case problem element. This idea, along with some of its 
consequences that we discuss in the next section, is a key motivation for 
our notion of randomized radius and a randomized setting for treating 
error and complexity. 
We now apply the ideas of this section to the integration example 
introduced earlier. Working in the n = 1 case where F0 = (0, 1) is parame- 
terized by s and A = (0, 1) is parameterized by t, we obtain from Eq. (I), 
above, J&(f) = SU~,~(~,~) E(s, t) = $[t2 + (1 - t)2], with the maximum 
reached at s = t. It follows that E* = $, with the strategy t = 4 yielding this 
“minimax” value. This simply restates that the worst case 1st minimal 
radius is Q as we found earlier. 
Proceeding from Nature’s point of view, we get E,(s) = 0 for all s E 
(0,l). This follows since the Algorithm Designer can choose t = f when s 
# t and t arbitrarily close but not equal to 4 otherwise. We then get E, = 
0, so it is clear that the pure game has no value and no equilibrium 
strategy pair. Note that Nature’s “best” strategy in this situation is to 
choose s = 4, in which case the Algorithm Designer does not have a 
strategy that will ensure a payoff of 0 (the inf that defines E,(s) is not 
achieved). 
Extending to the mixed strategy game, we see the power of mixed 
strategies to an unrealistic extreme. Choose a sufficiently small interval 
(say [& - 6,+ + S]) about 4 and let the Algorithm Designer vary the choice 
of evaluation point t with a uniform distribution on this interval. Call this 
strategy (Ye. Since any mixed strategy of Nature will “match” Nature’s 
choice of s with the Algorithm Designer’s choice oft with probability 0, it 
follows that &((~a) can be made arbitrarily small with 6 and hence that 
,!V?* = 0. Consequently, 8, = l?* and the game has a value of 0. No optimal 
mixed strategy exists for the Algorithm Designer, but the strategies (Ye for 
small 6 are “almost” optimal strategies. 
To show that such an extremely favorable situation need not always 
exist for the Algorithm Designer, we can change the rules by removing an 
interval such as (I, 8) from the Algorithm Designer’s allowable pure strate- 
gies. With the fortuitously favorable t = $ strategy no longer available, the 
Algorithm Designer must settle for almost optimal mixed strategies uni- 
formly distributed on intervals near 2 or 8. In this game we assert that a 
value of & is obtained, with an almost optimal pure strategy for Nature 
provided by choosing s arbitrarily close to 0 or 1. In this restricted game 
one thus obtains values of & and & for the randomized and worst case 
radii, respectively, while the average case radius turns out to be &. 
The above paragraphs tell us two significant things. First, we have an 
example of a problem where the randomized case radius is less than the 
worst case radius. Second, the Algorithm Designer can reduce the (ex- 
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petted) error by employing a mixed algorithm (strategy). Thus, in theory 
at least, randomized case analysis offers a refinement of the worst case 
approach and in this former setting the idea of mixed algorithms is un- 
avoidable. 
GENERAL RESULTS IN THE RANDOMIZED CASE SETTING 
We now apply various standard consequences of the theory of two- 
person zero-sum games to information-based complexity. We let n denote 
the cardinality of information, which is fixed but arbitrary. 
THEOREM 1. For any problem specified by a solution operator S and 
an error function E: FO X A + R with A = N,, X a,,, 
E, 5 8, I ,+ = ,.ydom(,y) I ,y* E ryt(,S). 
Furthermore, for any probability distribution p on FO chosen from E, 
ry(S, p) 5 E, 5 ryd”“(S). 
Proof. All the above inequalities follow directly from the various defi- 
nitions involved. In particular, the result for the average case radius 
evolves from the fact that ry(S, CL) = El(p) 5 E,. 
Thus, as promised earlier, we have shown that the randomized radius is 
intermediate in value to the average and worst case radii. In cases where 
exact determination of the randomized radius is difficult, Theorem 1 can 
provide a way of getting upper and lower bounds. To get an upper bound 
on the randomized radius, choose any CY = (N, 4) from A. Recalling the 
definition of J&y> and the fact that 8* I &((Y), computing &((Y) gives the 
desired upper bound. Likewise, choosing p from $0 and computing ,??i( cc) 
gives a lower bound for 8, and hence also for the randomized radius. The 
above computations are not as difficult as they might be since we need 
only take the supremum over pure strategies from FO to get &((Y) and an 
infimum over pure strategies from FO to get &(p). Thus we have: 
COROLLARY. For any (Y E A and any p E E’,,, Z&((Y) is an upper bound 
and I??,(P) is a lower case bound for the randomized radius. 
In the application of these ideas to the complexity of discrete problems, 
Yao (1977) refers to k, as the distributional complexity. Working with 
error rather than cost, we get the corresponding notion of the distribu- 
tional radius. This radius represents the largest error that can be ensured 
by a mixed strategy chosen by Nature regardless of the Algorithm Design- 
er’s response. 
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When the mixed strategy game has a value (& = J?*), these two radii 
are equal and we give an additional argument for the appropriateness of 
the randomized setting. In the absence of knowledge of how Nature will 
provide problem elements, we assume that Nature “seeks” the distribu- 
tion p* with respect to which the error over strategies from A will be as 
large as possible @i(p) = e,). If the game has a value, this “maximin” 
error will be precisely the randomized radius. Thus the randomized radius 
coincides with the average case radius precisely when the distribution p 
assumed over problem elements is Nature’s optimal mixed strategy. 
With the above paragraph as motivation, we now list various conditions 
under which a two-person zero-sum game will have a value for its mixed 
extension. 
THEOREM 2. Let E: FO X A define a two-person zero-sum game. Then 
its mixed extension will have a value under any of the following condi- 
tions: 
(a) FO and A are finite sets. 
(b) FO and A are compact subsets of finite-dimensional Euclidean 
spaces and E is continuous on FO x A. 
(c) 3 I”* E E and (Y E A such that 
E(f, a*) 5 E(p*, a*> 5 E(p*, a) Vf~F~andaEA, 
in which case l?(t.~*, a*) is the value while p* and (Y* are optimal mixed 
strategies. 
(d) Either Fo or A is conditionally compact in its Helly metric, in 
which case each player will have a a-optimal mixed strategy for any 6 > 0. 
Proof. Part (a) is Von Neumann’s minimax theorem, while (b) and (c) 
are standard results found in most game theory texts. Part (d) is more 
advanced (see Vorob’ev, 1977). 
Result (b) may be useful in what we propose for cases where strategies 
for Nature and the Algorithm Designer can be described by a finite num- 
ber of parameters. Our integration example is in this category, but the 
result does not apply since the error function E is not continuous. We do 
not give a self-contained statement of result (d), but for many problems 
arising in information-based complexity it may be the kind of result that is 
needed to ensure a value. 
There are various other results that may be relevant here, but we just 
mention them briefly. For practical purposes it would be important to 
know whether optimal strategies can be found that are discrete distribu- 
tions on the pure strategies and perhaps even pure optimal strategies. 
Such results depend upon the dimension of the underlying spaces and on 
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appropriate convexity or concavity conditions on the payoff (error) func- 
tion E. It seems unlikely that such conditions will be satisfied for the kinds 
of error functions with which we are working. 
CONCLUDINGCOMMENTS 
The idea of a randomized setting for computing nth m inimal radii and 
hence e-complexity is a natural and appealing one, but it is clear that 
many technical difficulties must be faced. Algorithmic solution of large 
finite games is challenging in itself, and systematic methods of attacking 
games are not currently available. Nonetheless, the randomized setting is 
a worthwhile conceptual framework for problems in information-based 
complexity. In response to philosophical objections about the aggres- 
sively maximizing and “intelligent” role sometimes ascribed to Nature, 
we make two points. First, this can be viewed as a convenient abstraction 
in the absence of any other knowledge about how Nature m ight behave in 
supplying problem elements. Second, this is precisely the same role that 
the worst case setting assumes and the randomized setting lessens, to 
some extent, the impact of a “hostile” Nature by allowing m ixed strate- 
gies. In this sense the randomized setting responds to objections raised 
about both the average case and the worst case settings. 
Actual application of the randomized setting to concrete problems 
offers a considerable challenge. Our unrealistically simple integration ex- 
ample does illustrate, however, that randomized (mixed) strategies by the 
Algorithm Designer can reduce expected error in the absence of precise 
knowledge of how Nature will behave. We note that the randomness of 
our example occurred in the information and not in the algorithm itself. 
An example where randomization over algorithms is called for would 
clearly be desirable. 
Even in cases where one m ight assume an “a priori” distribution for 
the purposes of doing an average case analysis, there may be uncertainty 
about the mean or the variance of the suspected distribution. In such 
situations we may deal with the mean or the variance by means of param- 
eter spaces on which to apply a randomized approach. This is a point of 
view taken in statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1954). 
We have argued that the existence of a value for the m ixed extension 
provides an important additional rationale for the randomized case set- 
ting. Theorem 2(d) indicates that continuity of the error function is likely 
to be a key condition in showing that a value exists for problems in 
information-based complexity. This suggests that the solution operator S 
should be continuous, as should the information operators and the algo- 
rithms we work with. Such continuity requirements have not played a 
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major role in the worst case setting, but they appear in recent work in the 
average case setting (Packel and Woiniakowski, 1987). 
Many of the interesting results and important questions treated in the 
standard settings of information-based complexity lead to new open ques- 
tions in the context of a randomized setting. Thus, the various positive 
and negative results on the existence of linear algorithms for linear prob- 
lems (see Packel, 1987) need to be formulated and examined in the ran- 
domized setting. Likewise, the lovely results in both the worst and aver- 
age cases on the power of nonadaptive information for linear problems 
(Wasilkowski, 1986) might be examined to see if they carry over. It is 
possible that some of the above results will emerge fairly directly simply 
by taking a supremum (for average case results) or extending to mixed 
strategies (for worst case results). We do not pursue these issues in this 
preliminary paper. 
We have restricted ourselves to information with fixed cardinality, but 
a more realistic approach would allow the algorithm designer to have 
mixed strategies whose pure components have varying cardinality. The 
study of information of varying cardinality in a randomized setting re- 
quires a significantly broader formulation than we have given here. Some 
results in context are obtained by Wasilkowski (1987). 
In spite of the difficulties and challenges mentioned above, we submit 
that a randomized setting can play an important role in complexity theory. 
Just as game theory, in spite of its relatively small number of triumphs in 
solving real-world problems, plays a vital role in modeling rational 
thought and behavior, a randomized approach can lay bare what it means 
for an algorithm (and its information) to be truly optimal. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am indebted to Henryk Woiniakowski for his timely and helpful comments on this 
paper. Partial support was provided by the National Science Foundation. 
REFERENCES 
BLACKWELL, D., AND &SCHICK, M. A. (1954), “Theory of Games and Statistical Deci- 
sions,” Dover, New York. 
LEE, D., AND WASILKOWSKI, G. W. (1986), Approximation of linear functionals on a 
Banach space with a Gaussian measure, J. Complexity 2, 12-23. 
PACKEL, E. W. (1987), Do linear problems have linear optimal algorithms? SIAM Review, in 
press. 
PACKEL, E. W., AND WOZNIAKOWSKI, H. (1987), Recent developments in information- 
based complexity, Bull. Amer. Math. Sot. 17. 
RABIN, M. (1976), Probabilistic algorithms, in “Algorithms and Complexity” (J. F. Traub, 
Ed.), pp. 21-39, Academic Press, New York. 
ALGORITHM DESIGNER VERSUS NATURE 257 . 
SAVAGE, L. (1972), “The Foundations of Statistics,” Dover, New York. 
TRAUB, J. F., AND WO~NIAKOWSKI, H. (1980), “A General Theory of Optimal Algorithms,” 
Academic Press, New York. 
VON NEUMANN, J. (1928), Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftspiele, Math. Ann. 100, 295-320. 
VON NEUMANN, J., AND MORGENSTERN, 0. (1947) “Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior,” 2nd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton. N.J. 
VOROB’EV, N. N. (1977) “Game Theory,” Springer-Verlag, New York. 
WASILKOWSKI, G. W. (1983), “Local Average Error,” Computer Science Department Re- 
port, Columbia University. 
WASILKOWSKI, G. W. (1986) Information of varying cardinality, J. Complexiry 2,209-228. 
WASILKOWSKI, G. W. (1987) “Randomization for Continuous Problems,” Computer Sci- 
ence Department Report, Columbia University. 
WO~NIAKOWSKI, H. (1986), Information-based complexity, in “Annual Review of Com- 
puter Science, Vol. 1,” pp. 319-380, Annual Reviews, Palo Alto, CA. 
YAO, A. (1977) Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity, Ex- 
tended Abstract for FOCS conference. 
